Robert Howard
Kroepel
20 South Shore Road
New Durham, New Hampshire
USA 03855-2107
Many
atheists object to the use of the term god because, they say, the term has
not been defined in such a way that it is not self-contradictory, thus, to
atheists, the term is meaningless.
The
problem atheists refer to is the problem of the omni-everything
God and the existence of Evil. [A capital G is used to designate the omni-everything positive being, God, and a capital E is
used to designate the negative being, Evil.]
The omni-everything God is supposed to be omnipotent,
translated as all-powerful [can
do anything], omniscient, translated as all-knowing [knows everything], and omnibenevolent, translated as all-caring [is perfectly compassionate].
Evil
is considered to be a negative being, or force, in contrast to the positive
being, or force, of an omnibenevolent God.
Here
is how the concept of an omni-everything God and the
concept of an Evil conflict:
IF Evil exists [as a being or as a force], THEN one
of these possibilities is true [assuming, of course, that gods/demons exist]:
(A) God is not omniscient – does not know evil exists, or did not know Evil
would exist.
(B) God is not omnipotent, because it cannot control Evil.
(C) God is not omnibenevolent, or, otherwise, is
evil, because, being the creator of everything including Evil, God must have
created Evil.
Against the self-contradictions implied by the omni-everything concept of gods, atheists have a valid
argument that the omni-everything concept of gods is
meaningless. It is not possible to discuss a concept of a god without having
some sense of his/her/its characteristics, and if there are logical
contradictions/inconsistencies among those characteristics, then it is not
possible to talk about a consistent god, a logical god, a rational god, a god
who/which might actually exist, be true.
But
what about the possibility of a lesser god, a god that is not necessarily
omnipotent/omniscient/omnibenevolent? Could such a
god be rational, meaningful, perhaps even true?
Or,
what about the possibility that Evil does not exist as a being or as a force,
but, instead, when bad things happen to humans, including good humans, the
cause is natural, as in the case of natural disasters, diseases, accidents, or
attacks by animals, or the cause is man-made, as in the case of humans wanting
more than they can have and choosing inappropriate means of reacting to not
getting all they want, or as in the case of criminal activities.
If
we eliminate the possibility of the existence of Evil as a being or a force,
then the omni-everything concept of gods is certainly
less self-contradictory, and perhaps not contradictory at all. Bad things
happen to good people because of nature or other men.
We
could, of course, get grumpy and complain that a truly omnibenevolent
God would protect us from natural and man-made negatives, but there is a
counter argument, proposed by theologians, but, nevertheless, having merit,
that God gives humans a chance to prove themselves worthy of entrance into a
positive afterlife in Heaven and, as such, God cannot or does not interfere in
man’s challenges, whether natural or man-made. Thus, a lesser god would be non-omnibenevolent, not all-caring,
certainly not as benevolent as men would like it to be.
A
concept of a lesser god might include the possibility that it is not
omnipotent, because it did not create anything from nothing, or the possibility
that it created by re-arranging what is already there in the universe – the
matter and energy of which all things, including gods, and events, including
the activities of gods – are comprised. This would be logical, because,
following the logic that something cannot come from nothing/something can only
come from something/nothing comes from nothing, then, a lesser god would be a
causer but not a creator, or would be a creator only in the sense of causing
things/events by re-arranging the natural matter-energy of the universe. Thus,
a lesser god would be non-omnipotent – not all-powerful.
A
concept of a lesser god might include the possibility that it might not know
everything, at least in the sense of being able to predict the future with 100%
accuracy. A lesser god might know the existence of all things/events in the
current timepoint, but not necessarily precisely what
will be the things/events in existence at a later timepoint.
Or there is a possibility that it might not know all there is to know about the
things/events of the current timepoint. Thus, a
lesser god would be non-omniscient – not all-knowing.
But
if a lesser god knows more than man individually or collectively, and if a
lesser god is more powerful than man individually or collectively, and refrains
from being completely benevolent by giving man a chance to deal with challenges
of nature and other men, then that lesser god is more likely to be a reality
than an omni-everything god, and, thus, the concept
of a lesser god is not totally irrational, and, in fact, becomes rational in
the sense of being a possibility, though, to be certain, that concept still
remains a concept to be proven, by the required logical/rational proofs of (A)
physical evidence consisting of things/events who/which can be seen/heard/touched/smelled/tasted
directly or by the use of machines such as telescopes, microscopes, audio
amplifiers, etc., (B) eyewitness reports from credible witnesses and
corroborated by credible corroborators, or/and (C) logical arguments based upon
premises which are verifiable/falsifiable/verified, leading to conclusions
which are true if the premises are true/verified and the conclusions are not
present in the premises.
We
thus see the possibility, at least, that whereas a concept of an omni-everything god is self-contradictory and therefore
illogical/irrational that a concept of a non-omni-everything
god is not necessarily self-contradictory and is, therefore, logical/rational,
or, at least, not totally illogical/irrational.
Thus,
a being who/which is more powerful, more knowledgeable and more caring than man
could well be a god.
There
are perhaps other qualities/characteristics we might expect of a god, namely,
that it is immortal, cares about mankind, involves itself in human affairs,
listens to and answers prayers, requires worship from mankind, etc., but these
are all subservient to the general concept of a
logical/rational/self-consistent/non-self-contradictory god.
We
thus have a rational concept of a god, true, a lesser god, but a god concept which is logical/rational.
We
still have the problem of proving that a god of any kind exists, regardless of
its qualities and characteristics.
Theists
can now have a concept of a god that is not self-contradictory. Atheists must
now use other reasons than self-contradictory concepts of gods to prove gods do
not exist. Agnostics can now have a concept of a lesser god to use for their
quest for ultimate truth, no matter what it is, but conclusive proof of a
lesser god ought to be easier to find than conclusive proof of a greater but
self-contradictory god.
All
of this searching would be relieved if the gods would simply show up and prove
they are in fact gods.
Thus,
the slogan of atheists and agnostics, as a challenge to theists, ought to be
thus: Show us the gods!!!